The present paper develops a two-country, two-good consumption-based asset-pricing model with firms, governments, and endogenous default decisions. The analysis shows that a negative economic shock in the U.S. increases equity return volatility beyond the standard firm leverage effects; this economic shock is transmitted internationally through the terms of trade and increases the risk of a sovereign default crisis in emerging markets. A rise in the risk of sovereign default, which is characterized by a contraction in economic growth, lowers the valuation of future firm earnings and thereby further increases the level of equity return volatility in the U.S. A structural estimation of the model provides support for this new channel; the expected loss in economic growth upon sovereign default helps explain the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. The results of this paper have important implications for recent empirical findings on the strong relationship between equity market volatility in the U.S. and sovereign credit risk in emerging economies, in particular during the financial crisis of
Introduction
A decade of international financial crises has illustrated the importance of understanding the interactions between the U.S. equity market and the risk of sovereign default in emerging economies. For example, sovereign credit spreads severely widened during the recent financial crisis, which was also characterized by a sharp increase in U.S. equity market volatility. 1 To date, we do not have a framework that facilitates our understanding of the relationship between equity market volatility in the U.S. and sovereign credit risk in emerging economies. The aim of the present paper is to provide such a framework.
The analysis shows that a negative economic shock in the U.S. not only produces direct adverse consequences for the U.S. equity market through a decrease in returns and an increase in volatility but also negatively affects the emerging markets that trade with the U.S. This economic shock increases their risk of sovereign default, which thereby amplifies the initial increase in equity market volatility in the U.S.
A structural estimation of the model provides strong support for this prediction; the adverse economic consequences of a sovereign default crisis in emerging markets help explain the level and volatility of equity returns. The contribution of this paper is in showing that the evaluation of financial securities in the U.S. should not ignore economic conditions in emerging markets. In particular, the importance of accounting for sovereign credit risk is clear, given that sovereign debt is currently the largest asset class in emerging markets and a major constituent in international crises.
This article endogenizes the default decisions of firms and governments within a general equilibrium model with international trade. The building block is a two-country, two-good consumption-based assetpricing model with a representative risk-averse agent for each country. The world consists of a developed and an emerging country that are subject to production shocks. Embedded in each country is a representative firm that produces a specific good and is financed by equity and debt. When considering a negative production shock in the developed economy, two sets of consequences arise. On one hand, this shock deteriorates the developed firm's earnings and increases its equity return volatility. The negative relationship between a firm's earnings and equity return volatility arises because of the presence of corporate debt, which creates a financial leverage effect, and of firm operating costs, which generate an operational leverage effect. Equity return volatility is thus countercyclical. On the other hand, this negative shock is also transmitted internationally through the terms of trade, which are defined as the 1 Empirical studies documenting the relationship between sovereign credit spreads in emerging markets and equity market volatility in the U.S. measured by the option-implied volatility index on the S&P500 (VIX) include, for example, McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) , González-Rozada and Yeyati (2008), Pan price of the developed country's good per unit price of the emerging country's good; the shock thus affects the emerging firm's earnings. The intuition is as follows: the negative economic shock in the developed country is accompanied by an improvement of the terms of trade because the developed good becomes relatively rare. As the terms of trade move against the emerging country, the relative price of that country's good falls, thus leading to a decrease in the emerging firm's earnings. 2 The emerging country's government collects less tax revenue when firm earnings are reduced. Therefore, a deterioration of the fiscal situation of this government increases the probability that it will be unable to service its debt. Sovereign credit risk is then high during adverse economic conditions. Defaulting on sovereign debt causes a loss in economic growth in addition to the initial production decline that triggered the default event. The risk of a contraction in economic growth reduces the expected value of future firm exports in the developed country through a depreciation of the terms of trade, which further decreases the value of the firm's assets and thus amplifies the initial increase in the level of equity return volatility. Thus, this paper suggests a new amplification mechanism of volatility that is, in essence, a "macro leverage effect."
A structural estimation of the model provides strong support for this new prediction. That is, the presence of sovereign default risk in emerging markets affects the level and volatility of equity returns in the U.S. The structural test of the model consists of estimating the expected loss in economic growth upon default using the generalized method of moments (GMM) developed by Hansen (1982) . The moments under consideration are the first two moments of equity returns in Brazil and in the U.S. over the past 15 years. I use information on monthly industrial production data for Brazil and the U.S. to generate the asset prices predicted by the model, thus producing the moment conditions, which are matched to those of the data as closely as possible. 3 I use Brazil as a representative emerging country for two reasons: first, it is a large trading partner of the U.S. and has sizable sovereign credit risk; second, the data on sovereign credit spreads, stock market prices, and industrial production for Brazil cover a longer period than for any other emerging country. A goodness-of-fit test suggests that the model cannot be rejected at 90% confidence level. In addition, the estimate of the expected loss in economic growth upon default is statistically significant at 99% confidence level and thus contributes to the explanation of the level and volatility of equity returns in Brazil and in the U.S.
An additional empirical analysis provides evidence for the countercyclical nature of both equity return volatility in the U.S. and sovereign credit risk, as predicted by the model using daily data for Brazil and for the U.S. over the period of 1994-2008. 4 The relationship between equity return volatility, which is estimated with a GARCH(1,1) model on S&P500 returns, and sovereign credit spread, which is measured with the JPMorgan Emerging Market Bond Index spread for Brazil, is positive and particularly high during the recent period of financial distress (2007) (2008) . 5 This positive relationship has induced the empirical literature to conclude that equity return volatility in the U.S. explains sovereign credit spreads in emerging markets. The model in this paper offers a complementary explanation: a rise in the risk of a sovereign default increases the level of equity return volatility in the U.S. through the macro leverage effect.
This paper builds on a number of models belonging to separate strands of literature. The two-country, two-good consumption-based asset-pricing model used in this paper is essentially that of Rigobon (2007, 2008) , which is based on the works of Helpman and Razin (1978) , Cole and Obstfeld (1991) , Dumas (1992) , and Zapatero (1995) . 6 The key contribution of the present paper is to introduce levered firms, governments, and endogenous default decisions into this framework. The modeling of the government in the emerging country, which issues some debt and decides the timing of the default, follows Gibson and Sundaresan (2001) , François (2006) , Yue (2006) , Arellano (2008) , and Jeanneret (2009), among others. However, sovereign default is opportunistic in these studies. In the present paper, sovereign default occurs when the fiscal revenues become insufficient to cover the debt service. Hence, a sovereign default is triggered by the inability rather than the unwillingness to pay. Defaulting causes local contraction in economic growth. This output cost of sovereign debt default is also present in the works of Cohen and Sachs (1986) , Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , Yue (2006) 5 To date, the empirical literature has focused on how sovereign credit spreads relate to the VIX, which is a forwardlooking measure, rather than to equity return volatility, which is a realized volatility measure. However, I provide evidence that the positive relationship between sovereign credit risk and the VIX arises from the positive relationship between sovereign credit risk and equity return volatility. Equity return volatility explains 80% of the variation of the VIX. The remaining part is attributed to a volatility risk premium, which has an unclear relationship with sovereign credit spreads. 6 The presence of a contagion effect of economic shocks through the foreign exchange market is in line with Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) and Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Rigobon (2005) . Both studies conclude that movements in exchange rates explain a large fraction of the contagion across international equity markets. 7 It is not clear, thus far, what the exact costs of sovereign default are; there is weak empirical support for the default costs due to reputation effect on future borrowing opportunities (Eichengreen, 1987; Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris, 2004), trade sanctions (Rose, 2005; Martinez and Sandleris, 2008) , and armed interventions since World War II (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006) . However, sovereign default seems to weaken the domestic financial system and thereby increase the probability of banking crisis (De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta, 2006; Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006; Borensztein and Panizza, 2008) . As major creditors of the government, domestic banks may thus be prevented from competing their consistent with the empirical evidence of Reinhart et al. (2003) , De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2006), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) , and Borensztein and Panizza (2008) . 8 The evaluation of firm assets builds upon the corporate finance literature (e.g., Mello and Parsons (1992) , Leland (1994 Leland ( , 1998 , and Morellec (2004) ). That is, shareholders select the default policy that maximizes the value of equity by trading off the tax benefits of debt and bankruptcy costs in default. This paper also relates to Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) , Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2009a,b) , and Chen (2009), who analyzed how macroeconomic conditions affect corporate capital structure decisions and the evaluation of assets; in this paper, the sovereign default triggers the change of macroeconomic regime, which reduces the valuation of future firm earnings through a contraction in output growth. A new outcome of the present paper is that the probability of sovereign default affects a firm's probability of defaulting, which thereby reduces the value of its assets. The value of a firm's assets then depends on this firm's decision to default before or after the sovereign defaults, which is determined ex ante by shareholders to maximize the value of equity. The government's default decision in the emerging country and the evaluation of the developed country's asset prices are then closely related.
Finally, the paper accounts for the role of the terms of trade in the evaluation of asset prices through the effect on sovereign and corporate credit risk. The reason is that the balance sheets are skewed towards debt denominated in a world basket and revenues denominated in the local good. That is, depreciation of the terms of trade has a negative balance sheet effect because it decreases the worth of both government fiscal revenues and corporate earnings relative to their level of debt, thereby reducing their capacity to honor their debt. 9 To my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to analyze the interactions between the foreign exchange market, international corporate asset prices, and sovereign default risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a two-country consumption- intermediary duties of providing liquidity and credit to the economy. 8 The direction of causality in the relationship between sovereign default and GDP growth documented in these studies raises some questions: debt default is a direct consequence of economic shocks that also hurt growth in a direct fashion. In addition, the anticipation of the default costs can affect output growth before the event. 9 Empirical evidence on the relationship between exchange rate depreciation and default include, for example, Reinhart (2002) and De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2006). In addition, Longstaff et al. (2009) provide recent empirical evidence that, after controlling for large set of global and local macroeconomic factors, sovereign credit risk increases as the sovereign's currency depreciates relative to the U.S. dollar.
The Model
The world I model consists of two types of countries, namely, emerging and developed. A developed country is a large country with a default-free government and a firm. An emerging country is a small market economy with a defaultable government and a firm. Financial markets are complete before and after default. The tax environment consists of a constant tax rate for corporate income and a zero tax rate for individual income. All parameters in the model are assumed to be common knowledge.
Structure of the Economy
Each country consists of a representative firm that raises revenues by producing a country-specific perishable good. There is a large number of infinitely-living households with logarithmic preferences in both economies. They are the owners and the lenders of the firms and the lenders of the governments.
These households receive the produced goods, which are then traded across countries and consumed.
In equilibrium, households do not save. The terms of trade are defined in terms of the price of the developed country's good per unit of the price of the emerging country's good. Both countries are subject to production shocks, which are propagated internationally through the terms of trade. A shock in a country is then perfectly shared with the other country.
Each government raises fiscal revenues by taxing the value of its domestic firm's earnings. While the debt issued by the developed government is risk-free, the emerging government can default on its debt obligation. It does so when the fiscal revenues cannot meet the required coupon payment. Therefore, the emerging country's creditworthiness essentially depends on the level of the emerging firm's earnings. The government of the emerging country also plays an important role in the path of the emerging country through its decision to issue and default on its debt. On one hand, the issuance of greater sovereign debt allows for the fostering of production growth in the emerging country, which is beneficial for the emerging firm's earnings. On the other hand, the increase in indebtedness raises the risk of a sovereign default.
In the event of default, the emerging country enters a recession, which is characterized by a fall in production growth. Thus, sovereign default occurs after negative economic shocks and induces significant costs for subsequent economic activity. Avoidance of this default cost in terms of economic performance, in particular for future fiscal revenues, is the sovereign country's motivation not to default. The fall in the emerging country's growth rate also has adverse consequences for the developed country's firm revenues through a depreciation of the terms of trade. Sovereign credit risk thus affects the evaluation of a firm's assets in both countries. The absence of regime in the developed country arises from the assumption that the government debt in that country is risk-free.
Because firms pay taxes on their earnings, they have an incentive to issue debt. Firms are then financed by equity and debt. A firm is liquidated when it defaults on its debt obligations. Shareholders decide whether the firm defaults before or after the government defaults. Default is triggered by the shareholder decision to optimally cease injecting funds into the firm. At that time, a new representative firm with identical value and level of debt emerges. The bankruptcy costs upon default consist of liquidation fees paid to a third party (e.g., lawyers) that are subject to taxes. The government raises taxes from the new firm's earnings and from the third party's gain after the firm's default. Therefore, there is continuity in production, consumption, and fiscal revenues. 1 
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Dynamics of Production and Macroeconomic Regimes
Let Y t denote the perpetual stream of output produced by the firm located in the developed country at time t, which evolves according to the process
where W y t is a Brownian motion defined on the probability space (Ω, F , P). The standard filtration of
The conditional moments θ y and σ y represent the expected growth rate and the volatility of the representative firm's output in the developed country.
The emerging country is characterized by two different states of growth, namely, a normal regime H until the government in the emerging country defaults on its debt and a low, or recession, regime L after the default event. The dynamics of the perpetual stream of output generated by the emerging country's representative firm is governed by the process
where W x t is a Brownian motion independent of W y t , which generates idiosyncratic shocks specific to the emerging firm, defined on the probability space (Ω, F , P). The standard filtration of W x t is F = {F t : t ≥ 0}. The representative firm's idiosyncratic volatility is denoted by σ x . Finally, the growth rate
whereθ x,i is the growth rate of output that prevails in the country in the absence of sovereign debt.
The growth rate is lower in recession than in normal times, such that θ decision of the government. I also assume that sovereign borrowing enhances economic growth through higher productivity growth, with θ x,c > 0. 10 The fostering of economic growth is thus the government's motivation to issue debt of coupon payment C.
Investor Preferences and Consumption
The representative household has logarithmic preferences, which allow for closed-form solutions for consumption allocations and the terms of trade, as well as ensure a constant marginal rate of substitution between goods. There is heterogeneity in consumer tastes to capture the possible home bias in the consumption baskets. The weights of the emerging good in the utility function of the emerging country and the developed country are expressed by a x and a y , respectively.
I determine the equilibrium allocation by solving the world social planner's problem to ensure Pareto optimality and follow Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) . The initial wealth of the representative household of each country is such that the central-planning welfare function allocates weights of λ x and λ y ≡ 1 − λ x to the utility levels of the households of the emerging and the developed country, respectively. Accordingly, the planner chooses country consumption so as to maximize the weighted sum of the utilities of the representative agents:
subject to the resource contraints
where ρ is the rate of time preference, and C kl denotes consumption of good l by the representative agent of country k. The optimal allocation of consumption is determined by
The prices per unit of the emerging good X and the developed good Y are denoted by P x and P y , respectively. I fix the world numéraire basket to be a Cobb-Douglas function of quantities of good Y and X with weights α and 1 − α, respectively. I normalize the price of this basket P 1−α x P α y as equal to unity. 11
The Exchange Rate
Following Dumas (1992) , the real exchange rate S is then expressed by the ratio of either country's marginal utilities of the emerging and developed goods (see Appendix 7.1 ): 12
with
From Itô's lemma, the exchange rate S follows the process
The mean appreciation rate θ s is the difference between the emerging risk-free interest rate and the developed risk-free interest rate r x = ρ + θ x − σ 2 x and r y = ρ + θ y − σ 2 y , respectively, augmented by some compensation for bearing aggregate output risk. 13 When a country experiences an output shock, the exchange rate adjusts exactly to offset any net payoff. This exchange rate satisfies the no-arbitrage conditions, which prove the redundancy of having a risk-free bond in each country. The exchange rate plays an important role in linking asset prices in the two countries. While the key drivers of the level of the exchange rate are the relative preferences for goods and the central planner's welfare weights, the dynamics (i.e., time-variation) of the exchange rate solely depend on the dynamics of macroeconomic fundamentals.
International Transmission of Production Shocks
Within the model, the propagation of shocks from one country to another arises from a Ricardian response to economic shocks. To see this, consider a negative shock in the developed country. This shock is accompanied by an improvement of the terms of trade S = Py Px because the developed good becomes relatively rare (i.e., P y increases). However, the improvement in the terms of trade implies a decrease in the relative price of the emerging good P x in unit of the world numéraire, leading to a fall in the value of the emerging country's output P x X, although output X remains unchanged. Firm revenues in both countries move in the same direction in response to an economic shock in one of the countries despite the independence of the output innovations of a country. 14 Therefore, a contraction of economic growth in the emerging economy is predicted to have strong effects on firm revenues P y Y in the developed economy.
State-Price Density
The state-price density ξ can be used to compute prices of any contingent asset, irrespective of the good in which the asset is denominated. It will thus be used to evaluate sovereign debt and the firm assets in both countries. It follows the process defined by (see Appendix 7.3 )
where r z is the risk-free rate prevailing under the world basket numeraire, given by
and
The state-price density is driven by the same set of shocks that drive aggregate output in the developed and the emerging countries. As systematic shocks affect the marginal utility of investors through today's consumption levels, the risk price of these shocks rises with economic volatility. A higher level of uncertainty, or a lower economic growth rate, then induces greater demand for the risk-free government bond. This flight-to-quality response lowers the risk-free interest rate in periods of distress.
The Government of the Emerging Country
The government of the emerging country raises fiscal revenues by taxing the value of the emerging firm's earnings at the tax rate τ net of the tax-deductible debt service of the firm. The capacity to service this debt depends on the dynamics of the government revenues
denotes the emerging firm's revenues; K is the firm's operating costs per unit of time (e.g., constant
wages paid to workers); and τ C f is the firm's tax-shield. All variables are measured in units of the world basket. From Itô's formula, the emerging firm's revenues Z satisfy (see
The sovereign defaults on its debt obligation when the fiscal revenues cannot meet the required coupon
In contrast to corporations, sovereigns are unable to issue additional financial claims to cover a revenue shortage. In addition, agents of the economy are unwilling to forego part of consumption to finance the government budget deficit. Therefore, the sovereign defaults when the firm's revenues fall below the endogenous default boundary 15 The default boundary Z D characterizes the sovereign's default policy, which is Pareto optimal from market completeness. The likelihood of defaulting increases when the emerging firm's output decreases and/or when the terms of trade depreciate. 16 The sovereign is also more likely to default and trigger an contraction in economic growth when the level of sovereign debt C, the firm's operating costs K, and the firm's level of debt C f are high, and when the level of tax rate τ is low. 17
The Price of Sovereign Debt
The lenders anticipate the behavior of the sovereign and reflect the associated wealth loss in the pricing of the sovereign debt. They require a risk-free rate of return r z per unit of time, which corresponds to the return on the developed country's default-free bond measured in the world basket. The sovereign pays a constant total coupon C at each moment in time. All terms in the debt contract are denominated in units of the world basket. Upon defaulting, the sovereign and its lenders restructure the terms of the debt contract and agree on a reduction 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 of the debt service. 18 I assume, for simplicity, that the sovereign cannot scale up its debt after default. The value of sovereign debt is (see Appendix 7.4 )
The first term is equal to the present value of the promised cash flows C to debtholders until default.
The second term corresponds to the present value of the recovered value of the debt after the government has defaulted. Finally, the market credit spread until sovereign default is determined by
Economic Conditions and Sovereign Credit Risk
A negative output shock in the developed country is transmitted internationally through a terms of trade response and, thus, decreases the emerging firm's revenues Z. The reduction in taxable corporate income in the emerging country reduces the level of fiscal revenues R = τ (Z − K − C f ) necessary to service the sovereign debt C, which raises the likelihood of defaulting and thus the sovereign credit spread CS. Sovereign credit risk is thus high during adverse economic conditions in either the developed or the emerging country.
The Firm
In this section, I determine the value of the firms' assets, which depend on whether the firms default before or after the government defaults. The evaluation of the representative firms in the emerging and the developed countries are obtained under identical assumptions. However, the value of the assets differs across countries because of heterogeneous levels of leverage C f and operating costs K.
I assume that the management acts in the best interests of the shareholders. I consider an exogenous infinite-maturity debt structure in a stationary environment. One the one hand, the perpetuity feature is shared with numerous other models, including those presented in Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Leland (1994) , and Strebulaev (2007) . On the other hand, the level of debt is assumed to be exogonous because most of the time firm leverage deviates from "optimal leverage". 19 I first discuss the firm value upon default, then derive the values of corporate debt and equity, and finally determine the default thresholds selected by shareholders.
Firm Value in Default
The shareholders strategically declare default on their debt obligation when the firm's revenues Z fall The value of the developed firm's debt is (see Appendix 7.5.1 )
where 
In the absence of arbitrage, the levered firm value equals the sum of debt and equity values. Hence, the value of the firm's equity E(Z) is determined by
The Firm's Decision to Default
Within the model, markets are frictionless, and default is triggered by the shareholder decision to optimally cease injecting funds into the firm; see also Leland (1998) and Morellec (2004) . The firm's default policy is characterized by the default boundary Z D f | T − ≤T + and maximizes the shareholder value such that the smooth-pasting condition
∂Z Z=Z D f | T − ≤T + = 0 is satisfied (see Appendix 7.5.3 for the value of Z D f ). The decision to default before or after the government is determined ex ante to maximize the shareholder value. The optimal default boundary thus satisfies
The above rule determines the conditions under which the firm defaults before or after the government.
The model predicts that the firm tends to default first when i) the firm is relatively more leveraged than the government (i.e., high C f and low C); ii) the firm has large operating costs (i.e., high K); iii) the loss of economic growth rate upon the change of regime is important (i.e., high ∆θ); iv) volatility in either country's economic fundamentals is low (i.e., low σ x and σ y ); v) either economy grows rapidly (i.e., high θ x and θ y ); and finally, vi) when the corporate tax burden is severe (i.e., high τ ).
Theoretical Predictions on Equity Return Volatility
This section uses the model developed in this paper to analyze the drivers of equity return volatility in the developed country. The volatility of a firm's equity returns is given by (see Appendix 7.5.4 )
Equity return volatility is predicted to depend negatively on the growth rates of output in both countries θ x and θ y , and on the corporate tax rate τ . However, equity return volatility is predicted to rise with increasing macroeconomic volatilities of both countries σ x and σ y , financial leverage C f , operational The countercyclical nature and the high level of equity return volatility arise from three effects. 21 First, the presence of corporate debt generates the financial leverage introduced by Black (1976) and Christie (1982) . When afflicted by a negative output shock, the value of a firm declines, which raises the probability of defaulting and lowers the value of equity (i.e., the junior claim) relative to the value of debt (i.e., the senior claim). The increase in the firm's financial leverage raises the volatility of equity returns.
Second, the presence of constant production costs K borne by the firm generates an operational leverage effect. Lev (1974) demonstrated early on that the presence of operating leverage raises the volatility of a firm's earnings, thereby increasing a firm's equity return volatility, as well.
The model suggests a third channel: the presence of sovereign default risk additionally raises the sensitivity of equity returns to economic shocks, which is due to the risk of a drop in firm earning growth upon the change of macroeconomic regime. When there is a risk that the emerging country enters a recession, which is triggered in the model through a sovereign default in that country, firms in both countries experience a decrease in the present value of their revenues, thereby depressing the value of their equity and increasing the volatility of their equity returns. The model accounts for all three effects. 22 
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Equity Return Volatility and Economic Shocks
The explanation of the level of equity return volatility is given by Figure 2 , which provides an illustration of the sensitivity of equity return volatility to economic shocks. The benchmark case is Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) , which is essentially the model developed within this paper in the absence of defaultable debt in a firm's balance sheet, of operating costs, or of the risk of a sovereign default crisis. In that case, the return on equity is equal to the growth rate of the developed firm's revenues, which is less than the growth rate in output because of the offsetting terms of trade effect. Therefore, volatility of this firm's equity return is equal to the volatility of its revenues. As illustrated in Figure 2 , the level of equity return volatility severely increases i) when the firm is levered, ii) when there are operating costs, and finally iii) when there is a risk of sovereign default in the emerging country. While the effect of the risk of economic contraction upon sovereign default on the level of equity return volatility is marginal in period of economic growth, this effect appears to be particularly strong during adverse economic conditions. z,x + σ 2 z,y . The parameters of the models are those presented in Table 1 with ∆θ = 0.002.
The contribution of the model resides in the prediction that a higher level of sovereign credit risk increases the level of equity return volatility in both countries. Section 4 provides a structural estimation of the model and tests whether the presence of the expected loss in economic growth upon sovereign default helps explain the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. beyond the financial and operational leverage effects. In addition, the model suggests that sovereign credit risk in the emerging country and equity return volatility in the developed country are countercyclical, as they are determined endogenously by the same economic shocks. Sovereign credit spreads in emerging markets and equity return volatility in the U.S. should then be positively related. An empirical analysis in Section 5 provides strong support for this prediction. 21 Alternative explanations of the countercyclicality of equity return volatility include Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Tauchen (2005) . These authors argue that investors with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty require compensation, thereby inducing negative co-movements between ex-post returns and volatility. Some models on limited equity market participation such as Basak and Cuoco (1998) are also able to generate asymmetric equity return volatility movements. 22 Alternatively, the introduction of portfolio constraints can also increase equity return volatility. For example, Pavlova and Rigobon (2008) show that the presence of a constraint that limits the fraction of wealth at a country's agents may invest in the assets of the other country amplifies the asset price reaction to economic shocks.
A Structural Estimation of the Model
The model developed in this paper is based on the assumption that a sovereign default event triggers a local contraction in economic growth, which is then transmitted internationally through the foreign exchange market. The expected loss in economic growth upon default, captured by ∆θ, is predicted to internationally affect asset valuation and, in particular, the volatility of international equity returns. In this section, I provide a structural test of this hypothesis and estimate the expected loss in economic growth ∆θ upon sovereign default using the general method of moments. I use monthly industrial production data for Brazil and the U.S. to generate the equity prices predicted by the model and the moment conditions. I show that this expected loss in economic growth helps explain the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. and Brazil over the past 15 years. I first discuss the estimation approach and then present the results. 
Data
GMM Estimation and the Choice of Moments
This section describes the econometric approach that I use to estimate the parameter of interest, ∆θ. The goal is to examine whether the expected loss in economic growth upon a sovereign default crisis in emerging markets has an international influence on the level and volatility of equity returns.
The econometric approach consists of testing a set of overidentifying restrictions on a system of moment equations using the generalized method of moments (GMM) developed by Hansen (1982) . The moments under consideration are the mean and variance of the equity returns in both the developed country and the emerging country. In comparison to the Maximum Likelihood estimation, the GMM technique is particularly attractive for an estimation of this type of asset pricing model. First, the GMM approach does not require that the distribution of equity returns or equity return volatility be normal; 23 second, the GMM estimators and their standard errors are consistent even if the assumed disturbances are conditionally heteroskedastic.
The GMM estimation procedure chooses the parameter estimates that minimize the quadratic form
where m(∆θ) is a vector of orthogonality conditions, and W (∆θ) is a positive-definite symmetric weighting matrix. Because I consider more moment conditions than parameters, not all of the moment restrictions are satisfied. The weighting matrix W (∆θ) determines the relative importance of the various moment conditions so as to give more weight to the moment conditions with less uncertainty. Following Hansen (1982) , when equal to the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix, the weighting matrix W (∆θ) = S −1 (∆θ) is optimal because ∆θ is determined with the smallest asymptotic variance. I estimate the covariance matrix using the Newey and West (1987) approach to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation with a correction for small samples. This covariance matrix is used to test the significance of the parameter.
The optimal weighting matrix W (∆θ) requires an estimate of the parameter ∆θ; at the same time, estimating the parameter ∆θ requires the weighting matrix. To solve this dependency, I account for a two-stage estimation method. I first set the initial weighting matrix to be equal to the identity matrix W 0 = I and then calculate the parameter estimate. I then compute a new weighting matrix with the parameter estimate obtained at the first stage. The parameter ∆θ is obtained by matching the moments of the model to those of the data as closely as possible.
Empirical Results
In this section, I present the empirical results and examine the explanatory power of the assetpricing model developed in this paper. Table 2 reports the parameter estimate, the asymptotic standard deviations and their associated p-values, and the GMM minimized criterion (χ 2 ) values. First, it is worth analyzing how well the model fits the data. As the model is over-identified, it is not possible to set every moment to zero. Therefore, the key concern is the distance from zero. The minimized value of the quadratic form J(∆θ) is χ 2 -distributed under the null hypothesis that the model is true with the number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of orthogonality conditions net of the number of parameters to be estimated. This χ 2 measure thus provides a goodness-of-fit test for the model.
The χ 2 tests for goodness-of-fit suggest that the model cannot be rejected at the 90% confidence level (see Table 2 ). The table uses the covariance matrix of the moments to test the significance of individual moments and provides the corresponding p-values. Table 2 suggests that the estimate of ∆θ is statistically different from zero. Therefore, the adverse economic consequences of a recession due to a sovereign default crisis explain the volatility of international equity returns beyond the financial leverage effect studied by Black (1976) and Christie (1982) and the operational leverage effect documented by Lev (1974) . Moreover, we cannot reject the fact that the moment conditions are not satisfied at the 90% confidence level. Thus, the model can simultaneously satisfy all moments and is therefore successful in explaining the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S and in Brazil.
To date, the existing international asset pricing literature has largely ignored the presence of defaultable debt in a firm's balance sheet, operating costs, or the risk of a sovereign default crisis. The prediction is that the volatility of an unlevered firm's equity return is lower than or equal to the volatility of this firm's output, depending on whether or not there is an offsetting terms-of-trade effect. However, the data suggest that the volatility of equity returns is far greater than the volatility of output (see Table 3 ). To date, it has been difficult to offer an adequate response to Shiller's (1981) critique: stock prices are too volatile to be explained by a simple asset pricing model with dividends or earnings. 24 In contrast, the results of Table 2 show that the model resolves this issue by accounting for financial leverage, operational leverage, and sovereign default risk. Finally, I analyze the magnitude of the loss in output growth due to sovereign default. The results
suggest an estimate of 0.21% for Brazil. As Brazil grows at 1.5% per annum (see Table 3 
Equity Return Volatility and Sovereign Credit Risk
The model predicts a positive relationship between sovereign credit risk in the emerging country and equity return volatility in the developed country. It also offers an intuitive economic explanation of this relationship. Over recent years, the relationship between equity market volatility in the U.S., in particular the option-implied volatility index on the S&P500 (VIX), and sovereign credit spread movements in emerging markets has attracted a great deal of interest. 25 The right panel of Figure 3 shows that the correlation between these two variables, which is computed 
Equity Return Volatility and Option-implied Volatility
To date, the empirical literature has focused on the relationship between sovereign credit spreads and the VIX, which is a forward-looking measure, rather than on equity return volatility, which is a realized volatility measure. I suggest that the positive correlation between the VIX and sovereign credit risk is mostly attributed to the positive relationship between sovereign credit risk and equity return volatility.
First, equity return volatility in the U.S. computed with a GARCH(1,1) model on S&P500 returns is the key driver of the VIX; it explains 80% of its time variation over the sample period. Second, Figure   4 (left panel) shows a positive relationship between sovereign credit spreads in Brazil and equity return volatility in the U.S. The relationship holds during both the pre-crisis period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) In contrast, the relationship between sovereign credit risk in Brazil and the volatility risk premium, which is the difference between the VIX and return volatility on S&P500, is unclear (see Figure 4 , right panel); the correlation between these two measures is positive but weak during the 1994-2006 period; however, it is negative during the subprime crisis period (2007) (2008) . This rather counterintuitive result arises because the volatility risk premium was negative and large in the fall of 2008 (see Figure 5 ) when sovereign credit spreads considerably widened (see Figure 3 , left panel). 27 Therefore, the model developed in this paper can offer an intuitive and economic explanation of the relationship between sovereign credit risk in emerging markets and equity market volatility in the U.S., when measured either with the historical volatility or the option-implied volatility. 26 The 2007-2008 crisis period is characterized by sharp increase in the correlation between equity return volatility and sovereign credit spreads in Brazil. This feature is typical in periods of high volatility (i.e., volatility of sovereign credit spread or of equity return volatility), as suggested by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) . When accounting for heteroskedasticity in these variables, the increase in conditional correlation displayed in Figure 1 is far more modest. The relatively low level of sovereign credit risk in Brazil during the recent years is certainly due to the important level of foreign reserves and the low level of indebtedness. 27 
Conclusion
This paper shows that the consequences of economic shocks in the U.S. on the U.S. financial market are greater than those predicted today. This analysis is based on a simple concept: a negative economic shock to the U.S. economy also affects its trading partners. In particular, this shock increases the risk of a sovereign default crisis in emerging markets, which triggers a "boomerang effect" that amplifies the negative effect of this initial shock on the U.S. financial markets. In line with the prediction of this The recent financial crisis has brought into question the diversification benefits of investing across asset classes. This paper offers insights on how governments and firms are closely linked in the economy.
In addition, the model predicts strong co-movement among corporate debt, sovereign debt, and the equity markets. The capacity to service sovereign debt and thus to avoid defaulting depends on the level of fiscal revenues determined by the level of the domestic firm earnings. At the same time, the present value of firm earnings depends on the likelihood of entering a recession, which itself depends on the risk of a sovereign default. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the interactions between firm and government default decisions can yield important new asset pricing predictions. This paper is also useful in improving our understanding of the drivers of equity return volatility and of its variation over time. For example, the combination of the transmission of shocks through the foreign exchange market and the leverage effects can explain the stylized fact that equity return volatility moves across countries in a coordinated fashion (e.g., Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990), Lin, Engle, and Ito (1994), Edwards and Susmel (2001) , Forbes and Rigobon (2002) ). Understanding the factors that lead some countries to have higher levels of equity return volatility than those of others is also of crucial importance for international portfolio allocation. The model predicts, for example, that heterogeneity in financial leverage, operational leverage, tax rate, bankruptcy costs, and the dynamics of the economy can explain the cross-sectional variation in equity return volatility. The framework developed in this paper thus lends itself to numerous international finance implications and extensions for further research.
Appendix
The Exchange Rate
The price of one unit of the emerging good to be delivered at time t in state w is equal to ξ x,t = λ x e −ρt ∂u x (C xx,t , C xy,t ) ∂C xx,t
= λ x e −ρt ∂ [a x log (C xx,t ) + (1 − a x )log (C xy,t )] ∂C xx,t
= λ x e −ρt a x C xx,t = e −ρt (λ y a y + λ x a x )
Dropping the time and the regime subscript and applying Itô's formula to ξ x,t yields,
The price of one unit of the emerging good to be delivered at time t in state w thus follows the process defined by dξ x,t ξ x,t = −r x,i dt − σ x dW x t , i = {L, H}
where r x is the risk-free rate prevailing in the emerging country, given by
Using a similar approach to obtain the price of one unit of the developed good to be delivered at time t in state w, defined by ξ y,t = λye −ρt (1−ay) Cyy,t
, we obtain dξ y,t ξ y,t = −r y dt − σ y dW y t (45) where r y is the risk-free rate prevailing in the developed country, given by
Finally, the exchange rate is defined by S t = f (t, ξ y,t , ξ x,t ) = ξy,t ξx,t , which is the same as the ratio of either country's marginal utilities of the developed good and the emerging good. 28 From Itô's formula, dropping the time and the regime subscript, df (t, ξ y , ξ x ) = f t dt + f ξy dξ y + f ξx dξ x + 1 2 f ξyξy dξ y dξ y + f ξxξx dξ x dξ x + 2f ξyξx dξ y dξ x (47)
The exchange rate S thus follows the process defined by
with θ s,i = r x,i − r y + σ 2
x (52)
The Dynamics of the Firm Revenues
Let's define the emerging firm's revenues as f = Z t ≡ P x,t X t = (S t ) −α X t (from the world basket numeraire) with dX t X t = θ x,i dt + σ x dW x t , i = {L, H}
and dS t S t = θ s,i dt + σ x dW x t − σ y dW y t , i = {L, H}
From Itô's formula, dropping the time and regime substricts, 
−ατ S −α X (θ s dt + σ x dW x − σ y dW y )
The dynamics of Z t is thus characterized by the process defined by dZ t Z t = θ z,i dt + σ z,x dW x t + σ z,y dW y t , i = {L, H} 
σ z,y = ασ y (63)
The Risk-Neutral Measure
Let be (Ω, F , P) the probability space on which the Brownian motions are defined. The corresponding information filtration is F = {F t : t ≥ 0}.
First, we define the risk-neutral measure associated with the pricing kernel under the world basket numeraire ξ t by specifying the density process ϕ t , ϕ t = E t dQ dP (64) which evolves according to the process
Applying the Girsanov theoreom, we obtain new Brownian motions under Q,W y t andW x t , which solve dW y t = dW y t − σ z,y dt (66)
Under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, the developed and the emerging firm's revenues then follow the process dZ t Z t =θ z,i dt + σ z,x dW x t + σ z,y dW y t , i = {L, H} 
The State-Price Density
The state-price density ξ t that prevails in a competitive equilibrium is equal to
= e −ρt λ y a y + λ x a x X t
where the first equality follows from the price normalization P 1−α where the default time on sovereign debt can be written as
